Task rules, working memory, and fluid intelligence by Duncan, J. et al.
BRIEF REPORT
Task rules, working memory, and fluid intelligence
John Duncan & Moritz Schramm & Russell Thompson &
Iroise Dumontheil
Published online: 18 July 2012
# The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Many varieties of working memory have been
linked to fluid intelligence. In Duncan et al. (Journal of
Experimental Psychology:General 137:131–148, 2008), we
described limited working memory for new task rules:
When rules are complex, some may fail in their control of
behavior, though they are often still available for explicit
recall. Unlike other kinds of working memory, load is de-
termined in this case not by real-time performance demands,
but by the total complexity of the task instructions. Here, we
show that the correlation with fluid intelligence is stronger
for this aspect of working memory than for several other,
more traditional varieties—including simple and complex
spans and a test of visual short-term memory. Any task, we
propose, requires construction of a mental control program
that aids in segregating and assembling multiple task parts
and their controlling rules. Fluid intelligence is linked closely
to the efficiency of constructing such programs, especially
when behavior is complex and novel.
Keywords Attention . Executive control .Working
memory . Individual differences . Memory capacity
Tests of “fluid intelligence,” such as Raven’s Progressive
Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988) and Cattell’s Cul-
ture Fair (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,
1973), are important for their broad ability to predict success
in many different kinds of cognitive activity, from laborato-
ry tests to educational and work achievements. Typically,
fluid-intelligence tests involve novel reasoning, using geo-
metrical, verbal, or other materials (Marshalek, Lohman, &
Snow, 1983). A large research literature has investigated
what basic cognitive mechanisms are measured in tests of
this sort. In particular, strong links have been suggested
between fluid intelligence and working memory (Ackerman,
Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Kane & Engle, 2002; Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990).
Working memory, however, is a complex concept. It is
often proposed that working memory can be fractionated
into distinct components, including somewhat separate
short-term stores for materials of different kinds (Baddeley,
1986), as well as distinct processing control functions, such
as resistance to interference (Kane & Engle, 2002) and
cognitive updating (Miyake et al., 2000). Not surprisingly,
correlations with fluid intelligence vary widely from one test
of working memory to another (Ackerman et al., 2005).
Previously, we have investigated a form of working
memory concerning the learning and use of new task rules.
The ability to follow new task rules shows substantial indi-
vidual differences (Duncan et al., 2008). In some cases,
failures take a striking form that we have called “goal
neglect” (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer,
1996): Though rules can be explicitly recalled, they exert
no apparent control over behavior. Critically, neglect
increases with the task complexity—that is, the number of
rules that the task requires (Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan et
al., 2008). This limit, however, seems rather different from
capacity limits that have been found in many, more
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traditional aspects of working memory. In particular, neglect
concerns not the processing requirements of an individual
trial, but rather the total complexity of the whole set of rules
described in the initial instructions. Neglect of a given rule
increases with the number of other rules described, even if
participants know that, for a given block of trials, these other
rules will not be required and can be ignored (Duncan et al.,
2008).
Any multistep behavior must be controlled by some
internal mental program defining and focusing on separate
task parts. At each stage of such a program, relevant infor-
mation and operations must be assembled, and irrelevant
material disregarded, creating an organized series of distinct
attentional episodes (Duncan, 2010a). We proposed that,
when task instructions are received, they must be transformed
into a new control program of this sort (cf. Anderson, 1983;
Fitts & Posner, 1967) that separates and defines the distinct
task rules as well as conditions for their implementation. This
calls for a form of working memory sufficiently large and
durable to encompass the complex and multifaceted informa-
tion that task instructions will typically contain. Neglect
occurs when the use of this working memory fails, so that
parts of the task control program fail to be implemented.
Our previous results suggested strong correlations be-
tween such task-rule working memory failures and fluid
intelligence. For simple forms of goal neglect, the correla-
tion with a standard fluid-reasoning task can approach .6
(Duncan et al., 2008). Limitations in the construction of a
mental control program, we suggest, are especially well
captured in tests of rule working memory when a new,
complex program must be built, as well as in standard tests
of fluid intelligence, which typically require that a novel
series of mental operations be assembled for each new
problem (Duncan et al., 2008). As all tasks require some
task control program, however, variable ability to produce
such programs would help explain universal positive corre-
lations between fluid intelligence and other tasks. This pro-
posal has much in common with other suggestions that have
linked fluid intelligence and executive control (e.g., Kane &
Engle, 2002; Marshalek et al., 1983; Wilhelm & Oberauer,
2006).
Goal neglect—that is, behavior in violation of task rules,
even though these are explicitly understood—is a character-
istic failure of patients with major frontal lobe damage
(Luria, 1966). In functional brain-imaging studies, fluid
reasoning is associated with a characteristic pattern of frontal
and parietal activity, incorporating major foci in the inferior
frontal sulcus, the anterior insula/frontal operculum, the dorsal
anterior cingulate/presupplementary motor area, and the intra-
parietal sulcus (Bishop, Fossella, Croucher, & Duncan, 2008;
Duncan et al., 2000; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover,
& Gabrieli, 1997). Lesions within this same set of frontal and
parietal regions are selectively associated with fluid-reasoning
deficits (Woolgar et al., 2010). The same regions show a
pattern of increasing sustained activity as new task instruc-
tions are received (Dumontheil, Thompson, & Duncan, 2011).
In corresponding regions of the monkey brain, neurons show
highly flexible response properties, selectively coding the
specific information required at each step of current behavior
(Duncan, 2001). Such results are strongly consistent with the
requirements of a flexible cognitive control structure, assem-
bling the specific content of each successive step into a current
mental program (Duncan, 2010b).
At first sight, working memory for task rules may show
an especially close link to fluid intelligence, with weaker
fluid intelligence correlations for other working memory
tasks. For example, a large review has suggested average
correlations in the .2 range between fluid intelligence and
simple tests of short-term memory, such as digit span, and
only slightly higher values for more complex tasks that mix
immediate processing and storage (Ackerman et al., 2005).
To compare absolute correlations across studies, however, is
hard, since such factors as the ability ranges of participants
may not be comparable. Here, we directly compared work-
ing memory for new task rules with a variety of more
traditional varieties of working memory, including digit
span, spatial span, visual short-term memory (VSTM), and
a more complex span task that mixed processing and
storage.
A variety of tasks can be used to assess working memory
for task rules. Here we used two tasks from a recent neuro-
imaging study in which brain activity was examined as task
instructions were received (Dumontheil et al., 2011). In line
with our previous work, performance in these tasks is
sensitive to the total complexity of the task instructions,
irrespective of the set of rules actually operative in the
current task block (Dumontheil et al., 2011; Duncan et al.,
2008). For a range of similar tasks, previous data from a
small group of participants suggested a correlation with
fluid intelligence in the region of .6 (Dumontheil et al.,
2011). In some cases (Dumontheil & Duncan, 2008, unpub-
lished data; see also data of current study), performance failures
take the form of frank goal neglect, with task rules remembered
but neglected in behavior.
Method
Participants
For optimal correlational data, we sought a broad distribu-
tion of fluid-intelligence scores, approximately representa-
tive of variability in the normal population. On the basis of
prior testing with the Culture Fair test, Scale 2, Form A
(Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973), we
selected a group of 88 participants ranging in age from 19
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to 65 (median 48) years. Their mean Culture Fair IQ was
103, SD 0 14, range 76–139. The group was selected to
ensure that Culture Fair IQ was approximately independent
of age, with mean IQs of 103 in both younger and older
participants (median split on age).1 All participants were
paid for their time.
Testing session
The tasks described here were administered with a number
of others in a test session approximately 90 min in total
duration. Tasks were administered in the fixed order in
which they are described below. For the computerized tests,
stimuli were presented on a standard LCD monitor with a
resolution of 1,024 × 768 pixels.
Rule working memory
Each participant completed two versions of the rule working
memory task, one termed “animals” and the other “shapes”
(Fig. 1). In each task, five rules (Fig. 1) determined the correct
responses to different displays. Each display appeared for 2 s,
followed by a 300-ms blank screen before onset of the next
display. Responses were made on a standard computer key-
board using the index and middle fingers of the two hands.
Participants were encouraged to respond to each stimulus
before the next was presented, and responses were accepted
up to this point.
Each task began with a series of instruction screens, each
presented for 30 s. The first screen contained an overview of
the stimuli and responses. Each of the five following screens
gave a verbal description of one of the rules (Rules 1–5, in
the order shown in Fig. 1), an example of a stimulus display
in which that rule would be applicable, and a schematic
representation of the response. After viewing all six screens,
participants’ memory for the rules was assessed by asking
them how they would respond to each stimulus condition. If
any incorrect answers were given, participants were cor-
rected and questioned on each rule again. This procedure
continued until all of their answers were correct. Participants
then completed a practice block containing 16 trials, fol-
lowed by two experimental blocks, each containing 20
trials. After completing both experimental blocks, rule
memory was assessed again. In contrast to the assessment
conducted prior to the task, each rule was now probed only
once.
For the animals task (Fig. 1), displays were constructed
using a wide variety of full-color animal photographs. Each
picture subtended approximately 4 deg of visual angle, offset
vertically from screen center by approximately ±2.5 deg. The
symbols presented between the two animal pictures (Fig. 1)
were either two squares or two circles, offset horizontally by
approximately ±1.25 deg. The two symbols differed in size,
with the larger one always at least 25% greater in height/width
than the smaller one (individual shape sizes varied from 0.5 to
1.5 deg, edge to edge).
For the shapes task (Fig. 1), the shapes were circles,
squares, diamonds, triangles, hearts, stars, or plus signs,
presented in white, blue, red, green, cyan, purple, or yellow.
The size of all shapes was 3 deg. Of the two clusters of dots
(Fig. 1), one contained at least 50% more dots than the other
(individual cluster sizes varied from 2 to 23 dots). The
overall display layout matched that in the animals task.
To score rule working memory, each task was regarded as
a list of five rules to be stored/used. In each task, the mean
percentage of correct responses was calculated for each of
the five separate trial types (rules). The net rule working
memory score was the mean of these values across the total
of ten rules employed.
Digit span
On each trial, the experimenter read a list of numbers, which
the participant was immediately to repeat back in the same
order. The test used the materials and procedures from the
WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). The sequence lengths ranged
from 2 to 9 items, each presented twice; the score was the
total number of digits correctly recalled. Administration was
discontinued if a participant made an error in both presentations
of any particular sequence length.
Spatial span
This test used a plastic board onto which were fixed ten
cubes. On each trial, the experimenter touched a series of
cubes, which the participant was then to touch in the same
order. The test used the materials and procedures from the
WAIS-R NI (Kaplan, Fein, Morris, & Delis, 1991). Se-
quence lengths ranged from 2 to 8 items, each presented
twice; the score was the total number of positions correctly
recalled. Administration was discontinued if a participant
made errors in both presentations of any particular sequence
length.
Operation span
For the operation span test (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, &
Conway, 1999; Kane et al., 2004), working memory items
were interleaved with mental arithmetic. For each item,
participants were presented with a visual display that includ-
ed a mathematical equation followed by a word—for in-
stance, (4 × 2) – 3 0 5 :: STORE. Participants were asked to
1 As adult norms for the Culture Fair are not age-corrected, different
age groups matched for IQ are also matched in terms of absolute
performance.
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indicate verbally whether or not the equation was correct and
then to repeat the word out loud, after which the experimenter
presented the next item. After a series of items, participants
were asked to recall all of the words presented during this
series, in any order. Series (memory lists) contained 2, 3, 4, 5,
or 6 items, and participants completed three repetitions of each
list length. All participants were presented with the different
list lengths in the same random order.
All displays were presented in white, 14-point Arial font
on a black background. All of the equations contained two
operations: a division or multiplication (presented in paren-
theses) followed by either an addition or a subtraction. All
of the values used on the left side of each equation were
single-digit numbers from 1 to 9. The equations were given
with incorrect answers (deviating from the correct answer
by either 1 or 2) on half of the trials. The words were
monosyllabic concrete nouns of length 4–6 characters, with
Kučera–Francis (1967) written frequency values ranging
from 45 to 75 and concreteness ratings from 365 to 670.
The score was the total number of words recalled correctly.
Visual short-term memory
In the VSTM task (Cowan et al., 2005), each trial began
with a fixation cross presented in the center of the screen for
1,000 ms. Participants were then presented with an array of
colored dots for 150 ms. After a delay of 1,200 ms, a single
probe dot was presented for 1,750 ms, and participants were
asked to indicate whether the probe was the same color as
the dot that had appeared in the same position in the original
array. After a brief practice, participants completed 180
experimental trials, with 36 repetitions of five different array
sizes (1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 dots) presented in random order.
Within each set size, 18 trials contained probes whose color
matched the dot in the original array, while the remaining
half included nonmatching probes. The order of matching
and nonmatching probes was randomized. Nonmatching
probes featured either a color that had been presented in a
different position in the original array or a novel color. Dots
were presented in random positions within a notional 3 × 3
grid aligned to the center of the screen. Individual dots had a
diameter of approximately 0.5 deg of visual angle, and the
edges of neighboring dots were separated by approximately
0.4 deg, so that the maximum extent of the whole display
was approximately 2.3 deg. In total, ten different colors
were available, and the colors used on any particular trial
were chosen at random from this set. Responses were made
on a standard computer keyboard by using the left shift key
to indicate that the color was the same as in the original
array and the right shift key to indicate that the color was
different. The score was the percentage of correct responses
across all array sizes; this produced a slightly higher reli-
ability and IQ correlation than did a score based only on the
larger array sizes (4–8 dots).
Results
Descriptive statistics for each measure are shown in Table 1.
Correlations (Pearson’s r) between all measures are shown
Fig. 1 Example stimuli (left) and the five task rules (right) for the animals and shapes tasks. The actual experimental stimuli were presented in
color. Rules are numbered in the order of their presentation in the task instructions
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in Table 2, with reliabilities for the working memory scores
on the diagonal. Reliabilities were based on the Spearman–
Brown formula, calculated for rule working memory using
the average correlation between scores on the ten individual
rules, and for the other tests using either a standard split into
halves (digit span, spatial span, VSTM) or a split into thirds
(operation span; each third with one list of each length).
Of the five types of working memory assessed, rule
working memory showed the highest correlation (.57) with
Culture Fair IQ. As is shown in Fig. 2, the link of rule
working memory to Culture Fair score held across the IQ
range. For other tests, the Culture Fair correlations ranged
from .35 (operation span) to .45 (spatial span). The correla-
tion with Culture Fair was significantly higher for rule
working memory than for digit span [Williams test, one-
tailed, t(83) 0 1.69, p < .05], operation span [t(83) 0 1.98,
p < .05], or VSTM [t(79) 0 1.84, p < .05]; for spatial span, the
difference was not significant [t(83) 0 1.23, p 0 .11]. (The
variable df values in these tests reflect occasional missing
scores.) From the published reliability of the Culture Fair
(.87; Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973) and
the reliability of .79 of rule working memory (Table 2), cor-
rection for attenuation would raise the correlation between
these two to .69.
To define a “general intelligence” factor, a well-established
alternative to fluid-intelligence tests is principal-components
analysis, where the first principal component accounts for
much of the general tendency to positive correlations in a
diverse battery of tests (Nunnally, 1978). In our data, this
approach led to similar conclusions. Using the complete bat-
tery of six tests, the first principal component accounted for
41% of the variance. As expected, the strongest loading on this
first principal component was obtained for Culture Fair (.79),
followed by rule working memory (.71), spatial span (.65),
operation span and VSTM (both .56), and digit span (.52).
In each rule working memory task, performance on the
individual rules varied widely. For each rule in each task and
participant, we used an arbitrary criterion of <25% correct
(cf. Duncan et al., 2008) to define frank rule neglect. Com-
bined across rules, tasks, and participants, the mean rate of
neglect was 28%. Averaged across the two tasks, Rule 2
(Fig. 1) was most frequently neglected (mean neglect rate 0
42%), and Rule 5 was least frequently neglected (19%).
Even when a rule was neglected, this was usually (65% of
neglect cases) associated with correct rule recall at the end
of the task. As in previous studies, the results confirm that
neglect often occurred with intact explicit memory for the
task rules. To confirm that explicit memory failure did not
drive the Culture Fair correlations, the rule working memory
score for each participant was recalculated after excluding
rules not finally described correctly. This left the correlation
with Culture Fair unchanged (.57).
Although age varied widely in our sample, this variation
had little effect on Culture Fair correlations. Partialing out age
slightly increased the Culture Fair correlation (to .59) for rule
working memory, and for the other working memory tests, it
changed the Culture Fair correlation by a maximum of .02.
Discussion
These results confirm a strong link between fluid intelli-
gence and working memory for task rules. At .57, the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Test Score Mean (SD)
Culture Fair IQ 102.6 (13.5)
Rule Percent correct 56.2 (21.3)
Digit Total correct 62.0 (12.2)
Spatial Total correct 43.6 (8.4)
Operation Total correct 43.2 (7.0)
VSTM Percent correct 76.1 (7.2)
Table 2 Correlations between all measures
Culture Fair Rule Digit Spatial Operation VTSM
Rule .57 .79
Digit .38 .26 .79
Spatial .45 .42 .16 .56
Operation .35 .26 .53 .17 .88
VSTM .36 .32 .12 .32 .20 .88
Fig. 2 Scatterplot and the best-fitting regression line for the relation
between rule working memory score (y-axis: mean percentage correct
across all five rules and two tasks) and Culture Fair IQ. Each point
corresponds to 1 participant
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correlation between Culture Fair and rule working memory
was significantly higher than the equivalent correlations for
digit span, operation span, and VSTM, and it was numeri-
cally higher than the correlation for spatial span. We propose
that, in all tasks, a mental control program must implement
an integrated series of attentional episodes defining the
separate parts or stages that the task contains (Duncan,
2010a). If fluid intelligence is linked closely to the ability
to construct such programs, it may be measured especially
well when new task programs are assembled, defining sep-
arate task parts and the conditions that elicit them.
Given this proposal, an open question is how best to
interpret the correlation of fluid intelligence with other
working memory tests, including those examined in the
present study. Many previous studies have reported positive
correlations between fluid intelligence and different varie-
ties of working memory; on average these have been quite
modest (Ackerman et al., 2005), but in individual studies
they were sometimes substantial (e.g., Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr,
& Awh, 2010). One possibility is that all of these correla-
tions reflect the same basic function of controlling any task
by assembly of an appropriate control program or structure
of attentional episodes. Digit span, for example, requires
phonological working memory for the actual digits pre-
sented on a single trial, but at the same time, a broader
mental control program must ensure, for example, that at-
tention is paid correctly to the input as digits are presented,
and then switched smoothly to output as they are repeated.
The importance of the broader control representation is
suggested by correlations between fluid intelligence and
all kinds of tasks, even those not overtly concerned with
short-term information maintenance. It remains possible,
however, that fluid intelligence links to multiple separate
aspects of working memory, including maintenance of a
specific stimulus, as well as broader task control.
In this context, an intriguing finding is the comparatively
strong correlation between fluid intelligence and spatial span.
Inmany kinds of task, frontoparietal activity—resembling that
linked to fluid-reasoning tasks—increases with task difficulty
(Duncan & Owen, 2000). An exception occurs in spatial span,
in which activity is increased by the occurrence of organized
spatial chunks (Bor, Duncan, Wiseman, & Owen, 2003),
while at the same time such chunks improve performance.
Although fluid intelligence may be linked to spatial mainte-
nance per se, an alternative is that it is linked to the organiza-
tional process of detecting and using novel chunks.
Though any task will show some positive correlation
with fluid intelligence (Cattell, 1971; Spearman, 1927), the
magnitude of these correlations varies substantially. One crit-
ical factor is task complexity, with the lowest correlations
generally being associated with simple and repetitive tasks,
and higher correlations being associated with tasks combining
multiple novel parts (Marshalek et al., 1983; Stankov, 2000).
Correspondingly, the best tests of fluid intelligence tradition-
ally require novel problem solving, in which each individual
problem requires a new, often complex, set of component
parts to be identified and assembled. As the present results
show, however, complexity and novelty rather than problem
solving per se may be critical in producing high fluid-
intelligence correlations. When new task rules are explicitly
described, there is no overt element of problem solving.
Nevertheless, converting these instructions into an effective
task control program is closely linked to fluid-intelligence
scores.
When behavior is simple and familiar, the quality of the
control program may contribute only modestly to between-
person variability. With increased complexity and novelty,
however, programs may vary substantially in their effective-
ness, increasingly contributing to individual differences. In this
respect, the present measures of rule working memory may
form a bridge between traditional, relatively simple working
memory tasks, with their relatively modest fluid-intelligence
correlations, and the full complexity of novel reasoning.
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